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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The case for a public investment push is gaining increasing consensus in the policy debate. 
The IMF (2014), for example, has argued that, given current low government borrowing 
costs, and concerns about the impact on both potential and near-term growth of infrastructure 
bottlenecks in several countries, this might be a good time for a public infrastructure push. 
Using both cross country panel estimates and model simulations, IMF (2014) concludes that 
increased public infrastructure investment raises output in both the short and long term, 
particularly during periods of economic slack and monetary accommodation. 
 
In Europe, the “Juncker” investment plan launched by the Commission and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) aims at increasing public investment by at least 315 billion Euros in 
the medium term. In addition, individual countries, for example Germany, which has recently 
announced a boost to investment spending, are also budgeting to update their infrastructure. 
Similarly, in Japan, large part of fiscal stimulus under the so-called “second arrow” of 
Abenomics is earmarked to infrastructure projects. 
 
Against this background, it is important for the economic profession to evaluate the 
economic impact of increasing public infrastructure. In the existing literature, this has been 
done primarily by focusing on the implications for output, i.e. by looking at the output 
multipliers of fiscal policy. The main contribution of this paper is to focus on welfare, by 
using a New Keynesian DSGE model to analyze the welfare multipliers of public investment. 
This is a relevant exercise because welfare and output do not necessarily move in the same 
direction in a general equilibrium setting. Despite this, while the welfare multipliers of public 
consumption spending have been analyzed before, our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first systematic attempt to study the welfare multipliers of public investment in a state-of-
the-art DSGE model.  
 
Our focus on the welfare multiplier is inspired by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2011), who use a 
general equilibrium model to show that the commonly used “bang for the buck” calculations 
(by how much output increases for a dollar of public spending) are misleading in assessing 
the welfare effects of alternative fiscal policies, because they ignore the composition of GDP. 
Similarly, Sims and Wolff (2013), carry out a historical simulation for the US, which shows a 
strong negative correlation between the output and the welfare multiplier, concluding that the 
output multiplier is likely to be a poor measure of the welfare effects of a government 
spending shock. Following Rendhal (2015) and Sims and Wolff (2013), we measure the 
welfare multiplier as the consumption equivalent change in welfare for one dollar change in 
government spending. 
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Our main finding is that, in a benchmark parameterization of our model in which output 
multipliers are consistent with empirical estimates (as provided for example Gechert and 
Rannenberg’s (2014) and IMF (2014)), the domestic welfare multiplier of public 
infrastructure investment is 0.8, which implies that one dollar spent for public infrastructure 
investments raises domestic welfare by the equivalent of 0.8 dollars of private consumption. 
Our results therefore show that a public infrastructure push would not only, as already shown 
by previous studies, increase output, but would also have a positive effect on welfare.  
 
The open economy framework enables the analysis of the international welfare effects of 
domestic government fiscal intervention. Ignoring positive spillovers would underestimate 
the total benefits of domestic public infrastructure investment for the world economy. In our 
model, an improvement in the foreign terms of trade causes a welfare improvement in the 
foreign economy. The positive welfare spillover implies that the world welfare multiplier of 
public investment is larger (0.9) than the domestic welfare multiplier (0.8). 
 
The above result is not directly comparable to the existing literature in terms of its welfare 
implications, because our paper is the first one to study the welfare multiplier of public 
investment. One important observation, however, is that our analysis lends more support to 
those who favor an increase in infrastructure spending, compared for example to Mankiw and 
Weinzierl (2011), who argue that public investment is an ineffective stabilization tool from 
the welfare point of view, because it unambiguously crowds out private investment in their 
model. In our model, public investment does not crowd out private investment, consistently 
with the empirical evidence presented in IMF (2014). This can contribute to explain the large 
welfare gains that we derive from this kind of fiscal policy shock. 
 
Bom and Ligthart (2014) study the welfare effects of public infrastructure investment in a 
small-open economy. They find that that a permanent increase in public investment raises 
welfare in the long term if the output elasticity of public capital exceeds the public 
investment-to-GDP ratio which averages 3 percent in OECD countries. In line with the 
findings of Bom and Ligthart (2014), we find that the welfare multipliers of public 
infrastructure investment are sensitive to the output elasticity of public infrastructure. We 
find that the welfare multiplier is virtually zero when the output elasticity of public 
infrastructure is three percent. The welfare multiplier of public investment critically depends 
on its productivity and therefore ensuring a high productivity of investment is the key to fully 
reaping the benefits of an infrastructure spending push. IMF (2015) argues that governments 
should strengthen institutions that are responsible for the planning, allocation, and 
implementation of public investments to enhance the productivity of public investment. Good 
public investment management would secure a positive welfare multiplier of public 
investment.  
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Another important result is that the welfare multiplier of public consumption spending is 
negative at -0.3 percent in the benchmark version of the model. This result is consistent with 
Rendhal (2015), who shows that, if the duration of the fiscal expansion is 0-20% that of the 
crisis that drives the economy into a liquidity trap, the welfare multiplier of public 
consumption is in the -0.4 to -0.2 percent range. Furthermore, in our model the welfare 
multiplier of public consumption is negative when public spending yields low utility relative 
to private utility. This is consistent with Sims and Wolff (2013), who show that the sign of 
the welfare multiplier of public consumption is negative when steady state government 
spending is set higher than its welfare maximizing level. 
 
The policy implication of our analysis is that public infrastructure investment may be the best 
way to stimulate the economy not only from the output point of view, but also from the point 
of view of welfare. A public infrastructure push is desirable, because it has, if infrastructure 
is sufficiently effective, a positive welfare multiplier. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
discusses the parameterization. Section 4 analyzes the output and welfare multipliers of fiscal 
expansion. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
II.   MODEL 
We use a standard New Keynesian set up. There are two countries in the world, which we 
label home and foreign. The world population is normalized to one, and there is a continuum 
of firms and households indexed by ]1,0[z . A fraction n (1-n) of households and firms are 
domestic (foreign). Within this framework, we look at two kind of public spending: 
consumption and infrastructure investment. 
 
A.   Demand Side: Households 
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the representative domestic 
household is given by 
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where 10    is the discount factor, tC is a private consumption index, CtG  is public 
consumption and  is the weight of public consumption relative to private consumption. We 
assume endogenous labor supply, where )(zlt  is the household’s labor supply,   is the 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply.  
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The private consumption index is defined as  
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where htC  ( ftC ) is an index of domestic (foreign) goods and ρ > 0 is the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods (cross-country substitutability). In this 
setup, n )10(  n  is the share of domestic goods in the consumption basket, and the 
parameter α >1 captures the degree of home bias in consumption. 
 
The government consumption indexes are identical to the private consumption ones. In 
addition, an analogous index governs public infrastructure spending. 
 
The consumption of domestic and foreign goods htC and ftC are aggregates defined as 
follows  
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where )(zc ht ( )(zc ft ) is the consumption of differentiated domestic (foreign) good z by the 
representative domestic household, and θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two 
goods produced in the same country (within-country substitutability). 
 
The foreign private consumption index is 
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where asterisks indicate consumption by the representative foreign household, and *n
)10( *  n  is the share of domestic goods in the foreign consumption basket. We assume 
home bias in consumption, requiring α* < 1. 
 
Given the consumption indexes, the private demand functions for the differentiated domestic 
and foreign goods by domestic and foreign households are, with obvious notation  
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Demand functions for the consumption goods by the domestic and foreign governments are 
defined in an analogous way. 
 
In the above demand functions, )( zp ht  and )( zp ft  denote the domestic currency price of 
domestic and foreign goods, respectively, while htP  and ftP are the price indexes that 
correspond to domestic and foreign aggregate consumption baskets htC  and ftC . Price 
indexes are expressed in terms of the local currency, and corresponding foreign currency 
price indexes are denoted by an asterisk: e.g. )(* zp ht  is the foreign currency price of a 
differentiated domestic brand. htP  and ftP  are defined as 
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And the overall domestic price index is 
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The corresponding foreign indexes are defined in an analogous way. 
 
The budget constraint of the domestic household is given by  
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where tD  denotes holding of domestic nominal bonds (denominated in domestic currency), 
ti  the nominal interest rate on bonds between t-1 and t, tw  the nominal wage, t nominal 
dividends (profits) of domestic firms, and tT  lump-sum taxes. The domestic bond is the only 
internally traded asset and a global asset-market clearing condition holds for domestic bonds:
0)1( *  tt DnnD . 
 8 
 
The foreign economy is similar to the domestic one, except for the fact that the foreign bond 
(F*), denominated in the foreign currency, is not traded internationally. The net supply of 
foreign bonds is zero, because the foreign country has only one representative household. 
The budget constraint of the foreign household is  
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where tS  is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of the foreign currency expressed 
in the domestic currency, so that an increase in it is an exchange rate depreciation for the 
domestic currency.  
 
In order to ensure stationarity of the model, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and 
assume that the domestic interest rate is increasing in the level of net foreign debt. This is 
done by including a risk premium that forces external debt in the long term to return to the 
initial (zero) level. The interest parity condition with risk premium is given by 
    )1)(exp(11 1*   t
t
t
tt DS
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where )1)(exp( tD is the risk premium. 
 
The representative domestic household’s optimality conditions are 
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Equation (3) is the Euler equation of consumption, which implies that the representative 
household smooths consumption. Equation (4) governs the optimal labor supply. The labor 
supply is an increasing function of the real wage and a decreasing function of private 
consumption. 
 
B.   Monetary and Fiscal Policy  
The government budget constraint in per-capita terms can be expressed as 
 
C
t
I
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where T denotes lump-sum taxes and IG spending for public investment in infrastructure. 
For simplicity, taxes are non-distortionary. If an increase in public spending was financed 
with distortionary taxes, the expansionary effect of fiscal policy would be smaller. 
Consequently, the welfare multiplier of public investment might be somewhat smaller. 
 
Both types of public spending follow an AR (1) process 
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where i = I, C,  1,0i and it  is a zero mean white-noise process representing an 
unexpected change in public spending. Percentage changes from the initial steady state 
(denoted by the subscript zero) are denoted by hats (for example: 0ˆ xdxx tt  ).2 
 
The central bank adjust the nominal interest rate according to a log-linear Taylor rule with 
interest rate smoothing 
 
  1121 ˆ1ˆ  ttt iPi  , 
 
where coefficients 1  and 2  are non-negative and Δ is the first difference operator. If the 
economy was at the zero lower bound, welfare multipliers could be somewhat different. 
However, Rendhal (2015) has already analyzed the welfare multiplier of public consumption 
in a liquidity trap. In addition, the effects of a public infrastructure investment shock in the 
current version of the model are very well in line with the empirical evidence. 
 
C.   Supply Side: Firms 
As in Basu and Kollmann (2013), we assume the simplest version of the production function 
with public infrastructure. All firms produce differentiated goods with a production function  
 
))(()( Gttt Kzlzy  ,         (6) 
  
where )(zyt  is the output of the representative firm z , )(zlt  is the labor input, GtK  is the 
stock of public infrastructure, and  is the output elasticity of public infrastructure. We 
assume a positive  , which implies that the production function has increasing returns with 
                                                 
2 Variables whose initial value is zero are normalized by private consumption 
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respect to public infrastructure, as in Basu and Kollmann (2013), Bom and Ligthart (2014), 
Leduc and Wilson (2013) and Iwata (2013). 
 
Omitting private capital from the production function is a shortcut to facilitate the model’s 
solution. However, given the empirical result in IMF (2014), that public infrastructure 
investment does not crowd out private investment, this omission does not have significant 
implications for the main question in which we are interested in this paper, namely the 
welfare multiplier of an increase in public infrastructure.  
 
The stock of public infrastructure evolves according to  
 
I
t
G
t
G
t GKK  )1(1  , 
 
where   is the depreciation rate of public infrastructure. 
 
The domestic firm maximizes its profits  
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taking into account the production function (6) and the demand for its goods 
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where AtG is aggregate public spending ( CtItAt GGG  ). Using equations (6) and (8), 
domestic profits can be expressed as  
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Under the flexible price solution of our model, the domestic firm would maximize equation 
(9) with respect to )( zp ht , implying  
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Equation (10) expresses the fact under flexible prices the price of the representative good is a 
constant mark-up, determined by within-country substitutability, over the marginal cost.  
 
However, we introduce nominal rigidities following Calvo (1983), by assuming that each 
firm can reset its prices with a probability of 1  in any given period, independently of the 
time elapsed since the last adjustment and of other firms. Under this framework, the domestic 
firm seeks to maximize 
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where st ,  is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and s.  
 
The result of the firm optimization problem under Calvo pricing yields 
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A convenient and intuitive way of looking at the Calvo price solution is to log-linearize it as 
follows 
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The above expression makes it clear that the change in the optimal price is a weighted 
average of the changes in current and future marginal costs, and that an increase in the public 
infrastructure stock reduces the optimal price. 
 
 12 
D.   Consolidated Budget Constraint  
The consolidated budget constraint of the domestic economy can be derived by plugging 
equations (5) and (7) into equation (2), as follows3 
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We define the current account trade balance as the change in net foreign assets (following 
Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995) 
ttt
h
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The current account is the sum of the service account (interest income) and the trade balance 
account, defined as the difference between the value of domestic output and of consumption. 
 
E.   Initial Steady State 
We log-linearize the model around a symmetric steady state where both initial net foreign 
assets and public spending are zero )0( 000  CI GGD . We also assume that the size of the 
public infrastructure stock in the initial steady state is normalized to one. We would like to 
emphasize the initial level of steady state infrastructure is not a key to our main results; the 
output elasticity of public infrastructure drives the results, regardless of the initial level of 
public infrastructure. Under these assumptions, the consolidated budget constraint of the 
domestic economy (11) implies 00 yC  , and equations (4), (6) and (10) imply that the initial 
level of employment (and output) is  
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III.   PARAMETERIZATION 
The two countries are assumed to be of equal size (n=0.5).We set the discount factor   to 
0.995, since we interpret our periods as quarters, this is equivalent to a 2 % annual interest 
rate (as in Iwata (2013)).  
                                                 
3 The consolidated budget constraint for the foreign economy, which takes into account the market-clearing 
condition for domestic bonds and that the net supply of the foreign bond is zero, is
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In the literature within-country substitutability parameter θ is usually parameterized within 
the 5 to 21 range. We set at 11, based on Basu and Fernald (1997), implying a 10 percent 
markup over the marginal cost in the steady state. Cross-country substitutability is set at 
5.1 , a commonly used value in the international macro models (see, for example, Dong 
(2012)). Based on existing macro evidence and surveys (e.g. Keane and Rogerson (2012) and 
Chetty et al. (2013)), the Frisch elasticity of labor supply  is set at 0.7.  
 
The Calvo parameter γ is set to 0.5. This value is widely used in New Keynesian models and 
implies an average delay of two periods (six months) between price adjustments, consistently 
with the evidence presented by Bils and Klenow (2004) that prices tend to change twice a 
year.  
 
We set the home bias parameter of the model in order to imply a realistic import-to-GDP. We 
set α to 1.68 and 32.0/)1(*  nn , so that the import-to-GDP ratio (1-nα in the home 
country) is equal to 0.16 in both countries. This is equivalent to the average import-to-GDP 
ratio observed in recent years in the U.S., and Japan, and in the Euro area (see for example 
World Bank (2015) and Coenen (2013)). 
 
The risk premium in the UIP ψ is set to 0.004, consistent with Bergin (2006), implying that a 
net external debt of 10 percent of output increases the domestic interest rate by four basis 
points relative to the foreign country. The Taylor rule coefficients are set as 1 =0.79 and 
5.12  , following Clarida et al. (2000) and Taylor (1993). 
 
Fiscal policy is calibrated in a way that the persistency of public investment and consumption 
shocks is 0.75 ( 75.0i , i=I, C), consistently with the findings of Iwata (2013). The size of 
public spending shocks is 1 percent of initial GDP ( 1 CI  ). 
 
We set the weight of public consumption to relative private consumption to 1 = 0.4, as in 
Song et al. (2012)), who interpret this parameter as a measure of the efficiency in the 
provision of public goods. 
 
We set the quarterly depreciation rate of public infrastructure to 025.0 . This value is 
commonly used in models with public infrastructure (e.g. Bom and Lighhart (2014)). 
 
The output elasticity of public infrastructure is a key parameter for the issue that we 
investigate in this paper. Given the quite wide range of estimates in the literature, we rely on 
the meta-analysis carried out by Bom and Lighhart (2013), which uses a sample of 578 
estimates collected from 68 studies. Concluding that the short-run output elasticity of public 
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capital supplied at the central government level of 0.083. Accordingly, we set the benchmark 
value for output elasticity of public infrastructure at  =0.083.4  
 
Table 1. Parameterization of the Model 
Parameter Baseline value Description Source 
  0.995 Discount factor Iwata (2013) 
n 0.5 Relative size of the 
domestic economy 
 
  11 Within-country 
substitutability 
Basu and Fernald (1997) 
  1.5 Cross-country 
substitutability 
Dong (2012) 
  0.7 Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply 
Keane and Rogerson 
(2012) and Chetty et al 
(2013)
γ 0.5 Calvo parameter Bils and Klenow (2004) 
α 1.68 Home bias parameter World Bank (2015) & 
Coenen (2013) 
α* 0.32 Home bias parameter World Bank (2015) & 
Coenen (2013) 
  0.004 Risk premium in UIP Bergin (2006) 
1  0.79 Interest rate smoothing Clarida et al. (2000) 
2  1.5 Coefficient for inflation in 
the monetary policy rule 
Taylor (1993) 
CI  ,  0.75 Persistency of public 
spending shocks 
Iwata (2013) 
CI  ,  1 Size of public spending 
shocks 
 
  0.4 Weight of public 
consumption 
Song et al. (2012) 
  0.025 Depreciation rate of public 
infrastructure 
Bom and Lighhart (2014) 
 
  0.083 Output elasticity of public 
infrastructure 
Bom and Lighhart (2013) 
 
                                                 
4 We simulate the model using the algorithm developed by McCallum (2000) and Klein (2000) 
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IV.   OUTPUT AND WELFARE MULTIPLIERS OF PUBLIC SPENDING 
In this section, we present our results on the output and welfare multipliers of fiscal stimulus. 
We derive both cumulative and net present value fiscal multipliers, where the cumulative 
multiplier (CM) is defined as the cumulative change of output (or of any other relevant 
variable) over the cumulative change of public spending as some horizon (see, for example, 
Gechert and Rannenberg (2014)) 
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while the net present value fiscal multiplier (NPVM) is the sum of output over a certain time 
horizon (in our analysis we use 2,000 periods) discounted at the steady state interest rate, and 
divided by government spending discounted in the same way (see Uhlig (2010)): 
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What differentiate our approach from most of the previous literature is that we calculate not 
only the net present value output multiplier but also the net present value welfare multiplier. 
In calculating the welfare multiplier, we follow Sims and Wolff (2013), who define it as the 
one period consumption equivalent change in the present discounted value of flow utility for 
a one unit (dollar) change in government spending. In order to do this, we first need to 
measure the welfare impact of fiscal policy as a percentage of initial consumption that the 
household is willing to pay for fiscal expansion to be as well off in the fiscal expansion case 
as in the initial equilibrium (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)). 
 
Let   tsWFEsCWFEsWFEs zlGC )(,,  be the private and public consumption and labor supply paths 
without fiscal expansion (WFE). The associated net present value (NPV) of welfare is given 
by  
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
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We can then define NPV  as the NPV of the welfare impact of a fiscal expansion (FE) relative 
to case without fiscal expansion. It is measured as the fraction of initial private 
consumption—holding labor supply constant—that the household is willing to pay for fiscal 
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expansion. In particular, if FENPVU  denotes the net present value of welfare in the fiscal 
expansion case 
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we can solve for NPV , and express the welfare impact of a fiscal expansion as the percentage 
(rather than as a fraction) of consumption, as follows  
 
].1))(1[exp(100  WFENPVFENPVNPV UU       (13) 
 
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the utility function (1), we have  
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Welfare without fiscal expansion would be the same as in the initial steady state. Substituting 
(14) into (13) we can derive the NPV of the welfare impact of fiscal expansion as the 
percentage of initial consumption 
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Finally, to calculate the (domestic) welfare multiplier ( UM ) of a fiscal expansion we divide 
(15) by public spending discounted the same way:  
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As we have already mentioned above, the welfare multiplier is the consumption equivalent 
change in welfare for one dollar change government spending. For example, if the welfare 
multiplier is 0.5, this means that a one dollar increase in public spending yields the welfare 
improvement that corresponds 0.5 dollars increase in domestic private consumption.  
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Our open economy framework enables the analysis of the welfare multiplier for the world 
economy, while the existing models have studied welfare multipliers in closed economies. 
The welfare multiplier for the world economy is the sum of the consumption equivalent 
changes in welfare for one dollar change in domestic government spending: 
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In figure 1 we plot the value of fiscal expansion (not the welfare multiplier), measured by the 
percentage of initial consumption, that the household in willing to play for the fiscal 
expansion in period t: 
 
].1])ˆ)(ˆ))((ˆ)(1[exp(100 ,110   CFEsFEsFEst GzlzlC     (16) 
 
A.   Public Consumption 
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of domestic and foreign variables to a one percent 
increase in domestic public spending. The solid (dashed) lines show the effects of a public 
consumption (investment) shock. Generally speaking, variables are expressed in percent 
deviations from the initial steady state. However, the change in the trade balance, which 
initial value is zero, and the value of trade liberalization are expressed as deviations from 
initial consumption, and inflation is expressed in percentage points in annual terms.  
 
A government consumption spending shock increases domestic output. This is due to both to 
the increase in aggregate demand and to the wealth effect that, with endogenous labor supply, 
pushes domestic agents to work more when domestic taxes are increased. 
 
Table 2 shows that the cumulative output multipliers of public consumption are in the 0.4-0.5 
range, which is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Gechert and Rannenberg 
(2014) in a meta-analysis of fiscal multipliers based 98 empirical studies with more than 
1800 observations.  
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Figure 1. Effects of Fiscal Expansion. 
 
 
The domestic trade balance initially deteriorates, due to the import component of the 
increased government spending. In the medium term, however, the fall in domestic 
consumption due to higher taxes, together with the improvement in the domestic terms of 
trade (defined as the relative producer price of domestic exports in terms of imports), imply 
an improvement in the domestic trade balance. Such hump-shaped behavior of the trade 
balance is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Iwata (2013).  
 
The dynamics of other variables, including a short-lived increase in inflation due to the 
demand shock, and an appreciation of the domestic real exchange rate followed by a 
depreciation, are also consistent with Iwata (2013).  
 
Turning to spillover effects, we observe an increase in foreign output, due to both the 
increased demand in foreign goods stemming from the domestic fiscal shock and the short-
term appreciation of the domestic exchange rate in the short term. However, given the 
substantial level of home bias in government spending, this positive spillover effect is not 
very large in quantitative terms.  
 
Let’s now turn our attention to welfare effects, which are the main focus of our paper. 
Following a domestic government spending shock, there are two contrasting effects on 
domestic welfare. On one hand, the increase in labor supply and the fall in private 
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consumption due to higher taxes and the terms of trade imply a fall in domestic welfare. On 
the other hand, public consumption yields utility, so an increase in public consumption 
increases welfare 
 
As it can be seen from Figure 1, in the case of public consumption the first (negative) welfare 
effects dominate, because the weight of public consumption in private utility is small. As 
shown in Table 2 below, the welfare multiplier for domestic households is -0.3, meaning that 
they are willing to pay 0.3 dollars to avoid one dollar rise in public consumption. 
 
In comparing our results with the previous literature, it is interesting to notice that Sims and 
Wolff (2013), find a huge variability in the welfare multiplier, which, depending on the 
steady-state level of government spending, ranges between -8.6 and 35, while their output 
multiplier is 1.2. While in our benchmark parameterization we get a negative welfare 
multiplier for a public consumption shock, our model could also yield a positive output 
multiplier if government spending was set lower than would be the case if the government 
picked spending to maximize welfare. For instance, if we set the weight of public 
consumption 1  (compared to 0.4 in the benchmark parameterization), our welfare 
multiplier becomes positive, although just above zero. If 5.1 , the welfare multiplier would 
be 0.25. This implies than even in the (rather extreme) case in which the weight of public 
consumption is larger than the weight of private consumption in the utility function, our 
range for the welfare multiplier is much smaller (and, in our view, more plausible) than in 
Sims and Wolff (2013). 
 
Our results are consistent with Rendhal (2015), who finds that for a fiscal expansion of long 
duration the welfare multiplier is 0.65, while for a more temporary fiscal expansion it is 
smaller, and can turn negative. In particular if the duration of the fiscal expansion is 0-20% 
that of the crisis that drives the economy into a liquidity trap, the welfare multiplier is in the 
range of -0.4 to -0.2, which is very close to what we find in our benchmark case. 
 
The welfare spillover effect on the foreign economy, measured by (15), is positive. This 
reflects the fact that the improvement in the foreign terms of trade implies that foreign 
consumption rises by more than foreign output, which brings about a welfare improvement 
because it means that foreign agents can increase their consumption with a proportionately 
lower increase in labor supply. The positive spillover effect implies that the world welfare 
multiplier is less negative (-0.28) than that of the domestic economy (-0.30). 
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Table 2. Output and Welfare Multipliers. CM = cumulative output multiplier, PRs = 
periods. 
 CM, 
4 
PRs 
CM, 
8 
PRs 
CM, 
12 
PRs 
CM,16 
PRs 
CM, 
20 
PRs 
NPV of 
output 
multiplier 
Welfare 
multiplier 
World 
welfare 
multiplier 
Consumption 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.46 -0.30 -0.28 
Investment 0.58 0.79 1.0 1.3 1.5 3.2 0.77 0.91 
 
B.   Public Infrastructure Investment 
In this section, we focus on the effects of an increase in public infrastructure investment, 
including welfare effects. The latter is the main innovation of our analysis, given that papers 
which focus on the welfare effects of an infrastructure push are scarce in the literature. 
Below, we discuss how the macroeconomic effects of our public infrastructure investment 
increase, especially the output multipliers, are very well in line with the existing empirical 
evidence. This lends credibility to our welfare analysis, because it means that our study looks 
at the welfare impact of this policy in a reasonably realistic framework.  
 
In the case of a public infrastructure investment shock we have both a temporary demand 
effect and a supply-side effect, because the productive capacity of firms increased with a 
higher infrastructure stock. The second effect was missing in the previous case of a public 
consumption shock. Consequently, an infrastructure investment push increases medium-term 
output (Figure 1(a)), relative to the public consumption case. As it can be seen in Table 2, the 
cumulative multiplier increases with time, as a higher infrastructure stock expands productive 
capacity. The time pattern of the output response is consistent with the empirical evidence of 
Iwata (2013), who shows that the short-term effect of public investment is higher than the 
medium-term effect. 
 
Table 3. Output Multipliers. CM = cumulative output multiplier, PRs = periods. 
 CM, 4 PRs CM, 8 PRs CM, 12 PRs CM,16 PRs CM, 20 PRs
IMF (2014) 0.5 0.7 1 1.3 1.5 
Our model 0.6 0.8 1 1.3 1.5 
 
Table 3 shows cumulative output multipliers by IMF’s (2014) empirical study and our 
findings. Our multipliers in the first five years after the shock are almost identical to the 
findings of IMF (2014). Our results are also in line with the meta-analysis carried out by 
Gechert and Rannenberg’s (2014), who find that the cumulative fiscal multiplier of public 
investment is 1.4. 
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Coenen et al. (2012) use seven structural DSGE models, all used heavily by policymaking 
institutions, to study the output multipliers of fiscal policy. A result: the average first-year 
multiplier for public investment spending is 1.5, only slightly higher than the multiplier for 
consumption spending. In our model, the output multiplier of public investment is much 
smaller (0.6) and much more in line with the empirical evidence of IMF (2014), according to 
which the first-year output multiplier is only 0.5. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the NPV of the output multiplier, at 3.2, is much higher than the 
cumulative multipliers. This result is mainly due to the fact that, after four years, public 
investment spending has in essence returned to zero, but output remains high due to the 
increase in the productive capacity generated by higher public infrastructure. While very few 
papers have studied the long-term effects of public investment, our results point to a 
significantly stronger output effect of public investment in the long run compared to the 
existing literature. In the theoretical model developed by Bom and Lighhart (2014), for 
example, the long-run output multiplier of a permanent increase in public investment is 2.3, 
while Leduc and Wilson (2013) estimate that output returns back to its pre-shock level after 
ten years. This might suggest that our model could be overestimating the long-term benefits 
of public investment. On the other end, out results are consistent with the conclusion by Bom 
and Lighhart (2013) that public capital is more productive in the long term than in the short 
term.  
 
As Figure 1 shows, consumption falls in the short term. This result is determined by the 
increase in the taxation needed to finance higher public investment. The public investment 
shock also temporarily increases the terms of trade in the short term, which tends to increase 
private consumption, but the tax effect dominates, so that consumption falls in the short term. 
 
The trade balance effect is quantitatively in line with those observed in the case of a 
consumption shock. Even though domestic private consumption goes down in the short term 
for the reason discussed above, we observe a deterioration of the overall domestic trade 
balance in the short term, due to higher public spending for investment. In the medium, term 
the terms of trade dynamics is reversed. This is consistent with the empirical evidence of 
Iwata (2013), who finds that the trade deficit first worsens and then improves following a 
public investment shock. 
 
As in the empirical analysis of Iwata (2013), a public investment shock increases private 
consumption and brings about an initial appreciation of the real exchange rate, followed by a 
depreciation, while the short term interest rate (not shown in our graph) increases due to the 
reaction function of the central bank following the increase in inflation.  
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Overall, the macroeconomic effects of our public infrastructure investment shock are in line 
with the empirical evidence. This lends credibility to our welfare results, which are the main 
innovation of this paper, to which we now turn.  
 
As it can be seen from Table 2, our model points to substantial gains from a public 
infrastructure investment shock. The welfare multiplier of a public infrastructure investment 
is 0.77, meaning that households would be willing to pay 0.77 dollars for a one dollar 
increase in public infrastructure investment. The main intuition for this result is that the gains 
in productivity linked to enhanced public infrastructures imply an increase in consumption 
without an increase in labor supply, which improves welfare. 
 
Figure 1(j) shows that the welfare spillover effect is positive after some time. The 
improvement in the foreign terms of trade implies that foreign consumption rises by more 
than the foreign labor supply and output. The positive welfare spillover implies that the 
world welfare multiplier is larger (0.91) than the domestic welfare multiplier (0.77). 
Domestic and foreign households combined would be willing to pay 0.91 dollars for a one 
dollar increase in domestic public infrastructure investment. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper which analyzes the welfare multiplier of 
public investment spending. Bom and Ligthart (2014) study the welfare effects of public 
investment and show that a permanent increase in public investment raises welfare in the 
long term if the output elasticity of public capital exceeds the public investment-to-GDP ratio 
(which in OECD countries averages 3 percent). Since Bom and Ligthart (2014) show that the 
welfare results are sensitive to the output elasticity of public infrastructure, we have 
conducted some sensitivity analysis to see how our results depend on this parameter.  
 
The results of our sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 4. As it can be seen, in our model 
the welfare multiplier is close to zero (-0.042), when the output elasticity of public 
infrastructure is 0.03. IMF (2014) estimates that in case of low efficiency of public 
infrastructure the output multipliers are 0.6 and 0.7 after 4 and 5 years. Matching these 
numbers implies setting the output elasticity of public infrastructure to 0.02. In this case, the 
welfare multiplier is -0.19, compared to 0.77 in our benchmark case. Our findings are in line 
with those of Bom and Ligthart (2014), who find that the welfare effects of public 
infrastructure investment turn to negative when the output elasticity of public capital is 
smaller than three percent. 
 
What about the case of high efficiency in public investment? According to IMF (2014), in 
case of high efficiency of public infrastructure the output multipliers are 2.1 and 2.3 after 4 
and 5 years. We can roughly match those numbers by setting the output elasticity of public 
infrastructure to 0.131, which is also the estimate provided by Ligthart and Bom (2014) 
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estimate for the short-term output elasticity of core public infrastructure. As shown in Table 
Table 4, the welfare multiplier in this case reaches the very high values of 1.5. If public 
investment is chosen widely, they lead to high welfare gains. 
 
The policy implications of our analysis are clear: improving the productivity of public 
spending is key to fully reaping the benefits of an infrastructure spending push. For countries 
with a low elasticity of public infrastructure an increase in public investment is not desirable 
from a welfare point of view, because it implies a negative welfare multiplier. On the other 
hand, countries in which public spending is very efficient can realize very high utility gains 
from more spending on infrastructures. 
 
Welfare multipliers may be sensitive to the value of within-country substitutability, because 
it governs the level of initial output/employment. The lower it is, the more an increase in 
employment output and private consumption (of given size) increases welfare. If within-
country substitutability is set to 6 (21), implying a 20 (5) percent markup over marginal 
costs, the domestic welfare multiplier of public infrastructure investment increases (drops) to 
0.79 (0.76), when the output elasticity of public infrastructure is 0.083. Hence, welfare 
multipliers are not sensitive to changes in within-country substitutability.5 
 
In summary, our results suggest that if public infrastructure is sufficiently productive, public 
investment may be a very effective way to stimulate the economy not only from the output 
point of view, but also from the point of view of welfare.  
 
Table 4. Productivity of Public Infrastructure and Multipliers  
Output elasticity 
of public capital 
CM,16 
periods 
CM, 20 
periods 
NPV of output 
multiplier 
Welfare 
multiplier 
World welfare 
multiplier 
02.0  0.62 0.68 1.1 -0.19 -0.14 
03.0  0.73 0.82 1.5 -0.042 0.021 
083.0  1.3 1.5 3.2 0.77 0.91 
131.0  1.8 2.2 4.8 1.5 1.7 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is the first to analyze the welfare multiplier of public infrastructure investment. 
The welfare multiplier of public investment, under a plausible parameterization, is quite 
sizable. The fact that the output response is consistent with empirical evidence lends 
                                                 
5 In addition, welfare multipliers are not responsive to changes in the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.  
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credibility to our welfare analysis. For countries with a high elasticity of public infrastructure 
an increase in public investment is desirable from a welfare point of view, because it implies 
a positive welfare multiplier. In our model, the welfare multiplier is positive, when the output 
elasticity of public infrastructure is slightly higher than three percent, while the meta-analysis 
by Bom and Lighhart (2013) shows that it eight percent in practice. This suggests that the 
welfare multiplier of public infrastructure investment is likely to be positive. 
 
However, improving the productivity of public spending is the key to fully reaping the 
benefits of an infrastructure spending push. IMF (2015) finds that improvements in public 
investment management can significantly enhance the productivity of public investment and 
argues that governments should strengthen institutions that are responsible for the planning, 
allocation, and implementation of public investments. Good public investment management 
is needed to ensure a positive welfare multiplier of public investment.   
 
IMF (2014) shows that in a debt-financed increase in public infrastructure investment 
reduces the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The main policy implication of our analysis is that the 
time seems right for a global infrastructure push: it would not only increase output and 
reduce public debt-to-GDP ratio—as shown by earlier studies—but also yield quite sizable 
welfare benefits. 
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